Материал: Rethinking ethnicity, 2nd Edition by Richard Jenkins

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Dannebrog by the anti-immigrant, anti-Islamic right: the annual meetings of the Danish People’s Party, for example, feature platforms dominated by flags.

Thus, if it is not too much of a conundrum, defining features of ‘Danish nationalism’ may be, on the one hand, a refusal to acknowledge itself as nationalism and, on the other, assertive national chauvinism. Accepting this characterization, what are its other distinguishing features? Much depends on context: the Danes are, if nothing else, abundantly supplied with a classificatory hierarchy and choice of Others. In the Scandinavian or Nordic context a distancing rhetoric comes into play: ethnic jokes and stereotypes are common, touching on the most mundane areas of daily life (Linde-Laursen 1993). These only make sense, however, within a commonly recognized cultural, linguistic and political affinity, particularly with Sweden and Norway. Important as national-ethnic boundaries and identities are, the shared ‘imagined community’ of Scandinavia (Gerholm and Gerholm 1990; Gullestad 1989) is a resource that can be drawn upon to make regional sense of similarity and difference. Although the distances involved, greater linguistic differences, and more distant histories, mean that a shared Nordic identity remains an as yet unrealized political project (Götz 2003), it is nonetheless a ‘symbolic construction of community’ that makes a degree of ‘cultural’ sense to all parties (Sørensen and Stråth 1997).

The broader European context is more ambiguous. The distinction between Scandinavia and Europe is just one of the fault lines that structure that ambiguity: is Denmark European or Scandinavian? The conventional answer to this question, ‘something of each’, leaves unbroached the even more interesting question of why Scandinavia, or the Nordic countries, might not be considered part of Europe (Hansen and Wæver 2001). Nor has the admission of Sweden to the EU clarified the matter; Norway remains outside. These ambiguities came to a head in a prolonged political struggle within Denmark over ratification of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and European unification (Heurlin 1994; Skovgaard-Petersen 1994). They have subsequently resurfaced every time there is another European referendum (Buch and Hansen 2002; Haahr 2003).

After two referenda in 1992 and 1993, and only by a very narrow margin, the Danish political establishment achieved the ‘yes’ to European Union that it wanted. The reasons which informed the votes of those who were uncertain and opposed in 1992 were complex: distrust of centralization, defence of ‘Danish democracy’, a desire to preserve the Danish welfare state, fear of immigration, and dissatisfaction with the Danish political elite, all figured (Jenkins 2000b). These came together in a fear of reduced sovereignty (Lyck 1992; Sørensen and Væver 1992), which can only be understood in the historical context outlined earlier. There was also a cultural context, in which the perception of Denmark as et lille land, vulnerable to cultural and linguistic domination, played a part (Christensen 1994).

There is, however, another European context, and another fault line. Europe begins in Germany. Denmark has been invaded by Germany three times in modern history; the last time is a living memory. Influential in the modern construction of Danish identity was the question of Slesvig and Holstein, resolved by plebiscite in 1920 after a campaign in which Danes and Germans used stereotypes of the other to define themselves (Adriansen 1992). And here the contrast between Northern Ireland and Denmark becomes most obvious. The 1920 campaign about partition in southern Denmark was fought with posters and speeches; in Ireland in 1920 the

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matter was settled by guns and bloodshed. Today in the south of Denmark, a substantial minority of hjemme tyskere (‘home Germans’), Danish citizens who are linguistically German, ensures the continuing vitality of the issue, as does the presence of a linguistically Danish minority in Germany (Østergård 1995). The differences between the two countries in terms of size and affluence further feeds Danish distrust. If Danish nationalism exists, it is for many Danes, depending perhaps upon generation and geography, articulated as much in opposition to Germany as anything else.7 Anti-German feeling certainly figured in the 1992 EU referendum campaign (Jenkins 2000b).

And there are many other things against which Danish national identity can be defined: immigrants, Americanization, etc. One of the things that has been most striking is the level of recent collective scrutiny within Denmark of the nature of danskhed (Danishness). A range of issues have problematized what had previously been taken for granted if not consensual (Gundelach 2002; Harbsmeier 1986; Østergård 1992d). Among the most interesting epiphenomena of this debate are specifications of the qualities of Danish national character, whether by Danes – ‘individualism, solidarity, faith in authority and discipline’ (Østergård 1992b: 21) – or, more controversially within Denmark, by outsiders: privatized, individualized, suppressed and collectivized, according to Reddy (1993: 130–56).

As well as EU referenda campaigns and local perceptions of the presence of immigrants and refugees, this debate reflects other issues. The most important concerns the future of the danske vej, the ‘Danish way’ (Østergård 1992b: 63), the social experiment which since the mid-nineteenth century has attempted to blend capitalism with equality into a historical destiny which Denmark has chosen for its own: the nation as ‘a social laboratory’ (Manniche 1969). Rooted within an agrarian populist political tradition that is both egalitarian and libertarian, ‘This is the ultimate Danish discourse: Everyone is in the same boat’ (Østergård 1992e: 14). As this core component of national identity has come under pressure, not least from consumerism, affluence, increasing social stratification within Denmark and the pressures on the public welfare purse of a greying population (Greve 2004), so too has danskhed come into question.

Among the reasons I began to look systematically at the Danish case was the fact that conventional wisdom in the social science literature about nationalism didn’t help me to understand the place. Initially, as an intermittent anthropological tourist, I was fairly sure that there was some kind of nationalism going on – people cannot, after all, spend as much time waving and flying their flag as Danes do without being, in some sense, nationalists – but I was unsure how best to make sense of it. Now, after a more systematic look and proper field research, there remain questions to be asked about Danish nationalism. Is it really nationalism? And, if so, what are my reasons for identifying it as such?

In the first place – and it is not quite as trivial as it might sound – what I have described is, in some respects, identified as nationalism by some Danes. It is a contested description in Denmark, but it can be found sufficiently often to be credible. In the second, it is possible to offer a plausible definition of nationalism that is sufficiently broad to include the Danish case, but sufficiently focused to exclude cognate ideologies of ethnic identification. By this definition, the conditions for, and components of, nationalism are an ideology of ethnic identification (danskhed), ethnic criteria of political membership (Danish citizenship, which is contested for

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immigrants, particularly Muslims), a state context (Danmark), and a claim to a collective historical destiny (den danske vej).

The notion of ideology implies structure and organization as a body of knowledge of how the world is and how it should be. This is the ‘-ism’ in nationalism. Is what I have been talking about sufficiently organized to qualify? The answer is ‘yes’ and ‘no’. ‘No’, in the relative absence of nationalist movements or parties. ‘Yes’, in the existence of an extensive and explicit universe of discourse, a stream of tradition, which identifies, and identifies with, Denmark in terms of national character and historical destiny. This is the weak ideology of Danish nationalism, and it is showing signs of perhaps weakening further. The debate about danskhed, and the concern about threats to the danske vej, reveal a dissensus about how the world is, and how it should be, that is antagonistic to the certainties of nationalism. In the resolution of this uncertainty, Danish nationalism is being redefined.

Identity, ideology and the everyday

Danish nationalism, as I have described it, is an everyday and very ordinary matter, rather than a structured nationalist movement. The recent literature offers some suggestively homologous notions that may help us further understand the Danish situation. Emphasizing the everyday, Linde-Laursen talks about the ‘nationalization of trivialities’ (1993), the way in which national communities that are culturally very close in many respects, Danes and Swedes in this case, ‘do’ everyday life – washing the dishes, for example – differently, and use these distinctions as boundary markers denoting much larger imagined differences of hygiene and proper behaviour. In similar terms, Wilk contrasts:

official, planned, government policies of nationalism and unofficial, unplanned, nonpolitical ideas and practices of nationalism which are outside the power, reach or interest of the state. (1993: 296)

A broadly homologous distinction has been drawn by Eriksen (1993a) between ‘formal nationalisms’, ideologies of ethnic identification that are part of the institutional and political organization of the modern nation-state, and ‘informal nationalisms’, that are rooted in the daily round of civil society. Both exist in the context of the nation-state and may complement or oppose each other. When Duara (1993: 14) contrasts the ‘discursive meaning’ of the nation, located in ideology and rhetoric, with its ‘symbolic meaning’ – to be found in ‘cultural practices … such as rituals, festivals, kinship forms, and culinary habits’ – he also appears to address the same issues. More recently again, Michael Billig has explored in some depth a notion of ‘banal nationalism’ – as opposed to ‘hot nationalism’ – that speaks to a similar set of concerns:

the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced … these habits are not removed from everyday life, as some observers have supposed. Daily, the nation is indicated, or ‘flagged’ in the lives of its citizenry. Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic condition. (Billig 1995: 6)

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Most recently, Brubaker et al.’s exploration of the relationship between ‘everyday ethnicity’ and nationalism in a Romanian town (2006) is clearly mining a similar seam. Not the least important thing about these converging arguments and models is that they underline the ethnic character of nationalisms, and the importance of experience and the ‘cultural stuff’ in their everyday social construction.

In this context, the distinction between nationalism and national identity (Smith 1991, 1994) may be helpful: the latter is the ethnicity to which nationalist ideological identification refers. Borneman, writing about Berlin, makes a similar point when he differentiates nationalism, as a public ideology of identification with the state, from nationness, which is an implicit practical sense of being the kind of person, or living the kind of life, appropriate to membership in that state: ‘a subjectivity, not contingent upon an opinion or attitude, but derived from lived experience within a state’ (Borneman 1992: 352). This is another allusion to everyday civil society and the symbolic meaning of the nation.

National identity or nationness can exist in the absence of nationalism (and Ulster Protestants may be a case in point); nationalism without some kind of national identity is unthinkable. In Northern Ireland and in Wales, for example, the politics of authentic national identity are at the heart of organized nationalism and its ideologies and also distinct from it, threaded in and out of the banal routines of living in ‘cultural stuff’ such as religion and language. It is from the everyday and the banal that Billig’s ‘hot nationalism’ draws its sustenance. To take these ideas further, national identity is to nationalism as unofficial, informal, everyday nationalism is to the official and the formal. Informal, unofficial nationalism and national identity, if this argument is correct, are similar, if not actually the same thing. And the existence of formal, organized nationalism does not mean the absence of the informal, the unofficial, or the banal. Quite the reverse.

Nor should it be thought that everyday life is somehow free from ideology. Here we return to the ‘cultural stuff’ again. Everyday life is fundamentally ideological: in religion, in discourses about the various yardsticks of deviance – normality, respectability, propriety, morality (Jenkins 1998a) – in child-rearing wisdom, in folk history, in models of gender and sexuality, in the building-block categories of language. And, which is what interests me here, in discourses about ethnicity and its allotropes: locality, community, region, nation, ‘race’. These are all bodies of knowledge that make claims about the way the social world is and about the way it ought to be. Everyday ideology may not be formally structured and organized, but it has pattern and it matters in people’s lives.

If Borneman, Eriksen and Wilk, in particular, are correct in locating distinctions of this kind within the broader relationships between the state and civil society, then much will depend upon the nature and history of that relationship in any specific case. In Denmark, for example, where a strong state and civil society have evolved side by side along the danske vej, informal (or unofficial or banal) nationalism draws the formal symbols of the state – because, as Østergård reminds us, Dannebrog, despite its domestication, ‘actually symbolises the power of the monarchy and the state’ (1992a: 22) – into the intimate settings of daily life. In the process it becomes difficult to know where state and civil society begin and end in Denmark, and informal nationalism to some extent fills the space created by the relative absence of official state nationalism.

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These distinctions – between formal-official and informal-unofficial nationalism, between the discursive and the symbolic meanings of the nation, between hot and banal nationalism, between state and civil society – resonate with the arguments advanced in this chapter. As a convergent set of ideas produced by different authors, writing about different places, from different points of view, they offer the beginnings of a useful framework for understanding different nationalisms and the differences between them. They also remind us of the importance of maintaining a historical perspective. The relationship between state and civil society is, in any given case, the product of history. Nationalisms, ideologies of ethnic identification of a particular kind, are streams of tradition, universes of political discourse located within history. And as local political narratives, they are also social productions, by means of which people make sense of and live in a complex and changing contemporary world.

These case studies suggest that there is more to nationalism than is allowed by the ‘state modernization and industrialization’ model. Although comparison of this kind cannot ‘prove’ or ‘disprove’ anything, it supports a more flexible theoretical framework that is concerned with nationalisms rather than nationalism. Of course, the reader may doubt whether the case studies actually represent comparable phenomena. Certainly, they document very different histories and situations. In part, this is precisely my point. While each can legitimately be described as referring to ‘nationalism’, the differences between them are sufficiently significant to suggest that nationalism is a broad church with many mansions under its roof.

In Wales the nationalist tradition is recent and more or less unified, focusing on culture and language within a pragmatic acceptance of an existing constitutional status quo. Although it has its roots in nineteenth-century Romanticism, Wales during that period was already an integral part of a centralized state. Processes of economic or political modernization do not seem to have been central to the formation of Welsh nationalism.

In Northern Ireland, by contrast, constitutional and republican nationalisms, divided against themselves, are aspects of a tradition of resistance to rule from and by Britain which extends back to the early modern period and beyond. That tradition, however, has been discontinuous, adopted by different groups at different times in the pursuit of different ends. Taking account of the various historical expressions in Ireland of British nationalisms complicates the situation even further.

Danish nationalism is different again: implicit and elusive, a low-key ideology of everyday discourse rather than a matter of organized politics. Existing in a social and political context that in many senses refuses to legitimize nationalist movements, it reflects Denmark’s history of relationships with its neighbours and is an expression of faith in the Danish experiment in welfare state capitalism and social democracy. The complexities of the Danish case stem not only from the variability of nationalism but also from its subtleties and its relationships to other locally dominant political ideologies (social democracy and welfarism, in particular).

Yet, allowing for these differences – in degree of organization, strength or weakness of ideology, political goals and objectives, and practical strategies and tactics – these are all nationalisms. First, they are all, in some respect, identified as nationalism by the relevant locals. This is one of the reasons why a degree of scepticism about the possibility of Ulster Protestant nationalism is indicated. Second, it is possible